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Abstract
We study the critical effect of quarantine on the propagation of epidemics on an adaptive network
of social contacts. For this purpose, we analyze the susceptible-infected-recovered (SIR) model in
the presence of quarantine, where susceptible individuals protect themselves by disconnecting their
links to infected neighbors with probability w, and reconnecting them to other susceptible indi-
viduals chosen at random. Starting from a single infected individual, we show by an analytical
approach and simulations that there is a phase transition at a critical rewiring (quarantine) thresh-
old wc separating a phase (w < wc) where the disease reaches a large fraction of the population,
from a phase (w ≥ wc) where the disease does not spread out. We find that in our model the
topology of the network strongly affects the size of the propagation, and that wc increases with
the mean degree and heterogeneity of the network. We also find that wc is reduced if we perform
a preferential rewiring, in which the rewiring probability is proportional to the degree of infected
nodes.
PACS numbers: 64.60.Aq, 87.10.Mn, 89.75.-k
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I. INTRODUCTION
The representation of interactions in a human society as a complex network, where nodes
and links play the respective roles of individuals and their contacts, has been useful for
modeling, studying, and understanding many problems in epidemiology [1, 2]. Usually it is
assumed that diseases evolve faster than the topological evolution of the underlying network,
so that the links of the network can be regarded as static. With modern mass media, however,
the presence of an epidemic can be broadcast much faster than disease propagation. This
information will inevitably change the behavior of the individuals comprising this network
as, for example, they try to avoid contacts with infected people. In this way a feedback loop
between the state of individuals and the topology of the network is formed. Networks that
exhibit such feedback are called adaptive or coevolutionary networks [3–7].
Public health services are constantly searching for new ways to try to reduce the spread of
diseases. Interventions like vaccination [8] or total closure of workplaces and schools are very
effective, but come with a high economic cost. As a less expensive alternative we examine
here the effectiveness of a “quarantine”strategy, where healthy people are “advised”to avoid
contacts with individuals that carry the disease. That is, a healthy person has a chance to
suppress a contact with an infected neighbor and form a new tie with another healthy peer
(rewiring). The value of this rewiring probability could depend, for instance, on the concern
that the society has about the disease and, as suggested above, in a globalized world this
concern will depend on the broadcast news. The degree of media attention about the disease
is a parameter that could be controlled by public health services. Indeed, it is known that
spontaneous quarantine in the recent H1N1 pandemic was found to have a large impact in
reducing the final size of the epidemic [9].
Based on these observations, we propose two strategies for the propagation of epidemics
on an adaptive network, in which individuals alter their local neighborhoods with constant
quarantine probability w as described above, and systematically study the effect that the
quarantine has on epidemic spreading. We find a phase transition at a critical threshold
wc above which the epidemic is stopped from spreading. We show also how the epidemic
spreading in the presence of quarantine depends on the contagion and recovery parameters.
More importantly, we find that the initial structure of the network plays an essential role in
disease propagation at criticality, unlike in previous related models [6, 10–12] where results
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only depend on the average network connectivity. We also introduce a generalized form of
quarantine, where the probability of rewiring is proportional to the degree of the infected
nodes, producing a more efficient isolation of the nodes with high degree. This preferential
rewiring is more efficient than the case with w constant.
II. ANALYTICAL APPROACH
We consider the susceptible-infected-recovered (SIR) epidemic spreading model, which is
well established and accurately describes diseases such as seasonal influenza, SARS, or AIDS
[8, 13]. Initially, all nodes are in the susceptible state (s), with one node chosen at random
(seed) in the infected state (i). In the first strategy, strategy A, at each time unit, every
infected node i in the network tries to transmit the disease to each susceptible neighbor s
with infection probability β. If s does not get infected, then with rewiring probability w it
disconnects its link from i and reconnects it to another randomly chosen susceptible node,
different from its present neighbors. Thus, the rewiring probability w measures how fast
susceptible nodes react to the disease (the quarantine probability). Infected nodes recover
(r) after a fixed recovery time tR since they first became infected, remaining in the recovered
state forever.
To estimate wc we start by assuming that the network has a tree structure [14], so that
the disease spreads out from the seed and reaches a susceptible node s through only one of its
neighbors i. Then, if i becomes infected at time t0, the probability that s becomes infected
by i at time t0 + n, with n = 1, 2, ..tR, is β(1 − β)
n−1(1 − w)n−1. This is the probability
that s has neither become infected nor disconnected from i up to time t0 + n− 1, times the
probability that i succeeds in transmitting the disease to s at time t0 + n. Therefore, the
overall probability that s becomes infected before i recovers is given by the sum
TAβ,w ≡
tR∑
n=1
β(1− β)n−1(1− w)n−1
=
β
{
1− [(1− β)(1− w)]tR
}
1− (1− β)(1− w)
. (1)
This expression for the transmissibility TAβ,w is equivalent to the corresponding expression
in the standard SIR model
∑n=tR
n=1 β(1 − β)
n−1 [1], but with a non-infection probability
(1 − β)(1 − w), instead of (1 − β). When w = 0, Eq. (1) reproduces the known value for
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the transmissibility T = 1 − (1 − β)tR for the SIR model on static networks [1]. In this
formulation w plays the role of a control parameter of the transmissibility: for fixed values
of tR and β, T
A
β,w can be reduced by increasing w. By reducing T
A
β,w we can go from a regime
in which the epidemic spreads over the population (epidemic phase) to another regime where
the disease cannot spread (disease-free phase). The transition from the disease-free phase to
the epidemic phase corresponds to the average number of secondary infections per infected
node becoming larger than one, allowing the long-term survival of the disease and thus
ensuring the epidemic spreads to a large fraction of the population. In our problem, the
expected number of susceptible neighbors that a node has when it just becomes infected is
given by κ− 1, where κ− 1 ≡ 〈k2〉/〈k〉 − 1 is called the branching factor, and 〈k〉 and 〈k2〉
are the first and second moments, respectively, of the degree distribution P (k). Since TAβ,w
is the overall probability to infect a neighbor, the mean number of secondary infections per
infected node is
NAI (w) = (κ− 1)T
A
β,w. (2)
The infection will die out if each infected node does not spawn on average at least one
replacement, so for a very large system, the critical point is given by the relation (κ −
1)TAβ,wc = 1, or
(κ− 1)β
{
1− [(1− β)(1− wc)]
tR
}
1− (1− β)(1− wc)
= 1. (3)
The transition between free-disease phase and epidemic phase is analogous to the static
link percolation problem [15], in which each link in a network is occupied with probability
p and empty with probability q = (1 − p). When p becomes smaller than a percolation
threshold pc, the giant connected component disappears. In general, pc depends on the size
of the network N [16], but in the thermodynamic limit it can be expressed as pc = 1/(κ− 1)
[17]. Identifying p with the transmissibility TAβ,w, and using the relation between pc and κ
we find that on the epidemic/disease-free transition line:
TAβ,wc = pc. (4)
This result shows that the transition point depends on the initial topology of the network
through the moments of the degree distribution, as we shall confirm via simulation.
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A better strategy would be try to avoid the contact between susceptible and infected
individuals before the attempt to infection, i.e., only avoid the contact when you know an
individual is sick. In this second strategy, strategy B, at each time unit every susceptible node
attached to an infected node disconnects its link from i with probability w and reconnects it
to another randomly chosen susceptible node, different from its present neighbors. If s does
not rewire its link, the infected node i tries to infect it with infection probability β. Notice
that NBI (w) = (1− w)N
A
I (w). For this strategy Eq.(1) is replaced by
TBβ,w ≡
β(1− w)
{
1− [(1− β)(1− w)]tR ,
}
1− (1− β)(1− w)
. (5)
Comparing Eq.(1) and Eq.(5) we see that TBβ,w < T
A
β,w for identical values of β and w. The
new condition for disease to die in strategy B out follows from Eq.(5)
(κ− 1)β(1− wc)
{
1− [(1− β)(1− wc)]
tR
}
1− (1− β)(1− wc)
= 1. (6)
The two strategies represent different scenarios depending on the knowledge of the state
of infection of the nodes. For strategy A, susceptible nodes have no information about
the state of their neighbors until they are in physical contact. In contrast, for strategy B
susceptible nodes know the state of their neighbors before they are in physical contact. We
will show that this difference in the knowledge of the states of the nodes results in strategy
B being more effective at stopping epidemic spreading.
Fig. 1 shows phase diagrams in the w − β plane for strategy A and strategy B, obtained
by the numerical solutions of Eq. (3) and Eq. (6) respectively, for a network with κ = 5
(pc = 0.25). Two phases emerge: the epidemic phase for T
A,B
β,w > pc, and the disease-free
phase for TA,Bβ,w ≤ pc. The location of the critical line separating the two phases depends on
the recovery time tR. Fig. 1(a) illustrates the two limiting cases for strategy A: tR = 1 (upper
curve) and tR =∞ (lower curve), which are given by the expressions β(tR = 1) = 1/(κ− 1)
and β(tR = ∞) = w/(κ+ w − 2). Therefore, the pairs of (w, β) values in the region above
the curve β(tR = 1) are always in the epidemic phase, and below the curve β(tR = ∞)
are always in the disease-free phase. A striking consequence is that if β is larger than the
percolation threshold 1/(κ − 1), the propagation of an epidemic cannot be stopped, even
5
FIG. 1. β-w phase diagram for pc = 0.25. The curves correspond to tR = 1 (upper) and tR = ∞
(lower). The dark gray region will always be an epidemic phase, and the light gray always a
disease-free phase: (a) strategy A, (b) strategy B.
with the largest rewiring probability w = 1. Thus, strategy A is not an efficient mechanism
to control an epidemic when β is higher than pc.
For strategy B, Fig. 1(b) illustrates the two limiting cases tR = 1 (upper curve) and
tR =∞ (lower curve), which are given by the expressions β(tR = 1) = 1/(κ− 1)(1−w) and
β(tR =∞) = w/(κ− κw + 2w − 2). In contrast to strategy A above, if κ does not diverge,
i.e., the network has finite pc, the epidemic can always be stopped, even for β → 1. Notice
that the maximum value of w needed to stop a epidemic is wc = (κ− 2)/(κ− 1) = 1− pc.
Our theoretical predictions illustrate a novel feature about the dynamics of adaptive
networks in SIR models. While previous adaptive SIS and SIRS models have transition
values that depend only on the average connectivity of the network 〈k〉, and are independent
of the heterogeneity or structural correlations of the initial topology[3], our SIR model
predicts dependence on the topological structure through the higher order moments of the
degree distribution.
III. SIMULATION RESULTS
Our analytical approach predicts, through Eq. (3) and Eq. (6), a dependence of wc on
the initial network. In order to test and explore this dependence, we performed extensive
numerical simulations of our model starting from different topologies. We first used Erdo¨s-
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Re´nyi (ER) networks with Poissonian degree distribution P (k) = e−〈k〉〈k〉k/k!. Even though
these types of homogeneous networks are common in nature, many real social networks
are well represented by heterogeneous networks. Thus, we also used finite scale-free (SF)
networks with degree distribution P (k) = k−λ exp(−k/K)/Liλ(e
−1/K), whereK is the degree
cutoff. This distribution represents networks with a finite threshold pc, and appears in a
variety of real-world networks [18, 19]. We only consider epidemic propagation on the largest
connected cluster of the network, the giant component (GC).
In Fig. 2 we compare both strategies for ER networks. We plot as a function of w, the
average fraction of infected nodes nI(w) = NI(w)/NGC, where NGC is the size of the giant
component, on a ER network. This fraction is normalized by the corresponding fraction on
an identical fixed network, i.e., for the SIR model without quarantine, nI(0). We can see
that wc for strategy B is lower than wc for strategy A, as expected. This relation will hold
for any topology with the same κ (see Eq.(3) and Eq.(6)). Since strategy B is more effective,
from here to the end of the paper we will show only simulation results for strategy B.
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2
w
0
0.5
1
n
I(w
) /
 n I
(0
)
FIG. 2. Plot of nI(w)/nI(0) as a function of w for strategy A (©), and strategy B (), for a ER
network with 〈k〉GC = 4.07, N = 10
4 and 104 realizations. As we predicted previously, strategy B
is better than strategy A, shown by wBc < w
A
c .
Fig. 3 shows, nI(w)/nI(0) vs w for different β. In this figure, we can observe the strong
effect of quarantine and the critical threshold wc above which nI(w) approaches zero. Thus,
in the disease-free phase (w ≥ wc) only a small number of individuals get infected and the
disease quickly dies out. We observe, as expected, that the values of wc increase with β.
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This behavior matches the phase diagram of Fig. 1 (b), where the critical line has a positive
slope. Scaling the horizontal axis by the values of wc obtained by numerically solving Eq. (6)
collapses the curves, showing a excellent agreement between theory and simulations, as well
as a scaling behavior of the form nI(w) = nI(0)f (w/wc), as shown in the inset of Fig. 3.
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FIG. 3. Fraction of nodes infected as a function of the applied quarantine parameter w divided by
the fraction of infected nodes at w = 0 for three different infection probabilities β in an ER network.
(©) β = 0.05, () β = 0.1 and (♦) β = 0.15. Above a threshold value of w, no finite fraction of
the network becomes infected. (Inset) Data with w rescaled by the appropriate wc calculated from
Eq. (6). The curves collapse very well, showing universal behavior and good agreement with the
theory. In all simulations, 〈k〉GC = 4.07 (〈k〉 = 4 over all nodes), N = 10
4 and averages are over
104 realizations.
We also explored the dependence of wc on the connectivity of the network, by computing
nI(w)/nI(0) vs w for different 〈k〉 (see Fig. 4). We observe that wc increases with 〈k〉, due
to the fact that propagation is facilitated by having more neighbors, as in the original SIR
dynamics. The inset of Fig. 4 shows the collapse of all curves. Again, the good agreement
between theory and simulation confirms that Eq. (6) is a valid expression of the transition
point for the adaptive SIR model on ER networks.
Given that the second moment, and therefore κ, is large in heterogeneous networks, the
critical value wc turns out to be larger in heterogeneous networks than in homogeneous
networks with the same mean degree 〈k〉 and size N , as seen by considering Eq. (6) in the
tR ≫ 1 limit, where
wc ≃
1
1
β(κ−2)
+ 1
. (7)
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FIG. 4. Fraction of nodes infected as a function of the applied quarantine parameter w divided by
the fraction of infected nodes at w = 0 for ER networks with three different 〈k〉: 〈k〉GC = 4.07 (©),
〈k〉GC = 6.015 () , 〈k〉GC = 10 (♦). Again, while below wc a finite fraction of the network become
infected above wc the epidemic vanishes. (Inset) Data rescaled by wc calculated from Eq(6) . In
all simulations, β = 0.05, N = 104 and averages are over 104 realizations.
Since κ for heterogeneous networks is much bigger than in homogeneous networks we
expect that wc increases as the heterogeneity increases with larger K. For κ → ∞ we
expect that wc → 1 and that the transition will eventually disappear for large heterogeneous
networks.
In Fig. 5, we show simulations on scale-free networks for different values of K[20]. In
good agreement with our predictions from Eq. (7), as κ increases with K, wc increases. In
the inset we rescale by wc obtained from Eq. (6), and find good collapse (Fig. 5(inset)),
confirming the general validity of Eq. (6) for heterogeneous SF networks.
In very heterogeneous networks it is well known that due to high degree nodes, propaga-
tion processes are very difficult to stop [15, 21]. Thus, a constant probability of rewiring is
not effective for controlling epidemics in these networks, because such a strategy assumes all
nodes have the same importance in an epidemic, ignoring the function of higher degree nodes
as superspreaders. It is also well known that removing the high degree nodes of the network
(targeted percolation) [15, 22, 23] is a more efficient method to stop propagation processes
than random removal. This type of strategy is expected to be superior, but requires global
information about the network.
To test this prediction, we propose a new strategy of type B where w depends on the
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FIG. 5. Fraction of infected nodes still infected as a function of w for β = 0.05, tR = 20 on an SF
network with K = 10 (©) and K = 20 (), λ = 2.1 with N = 105. pc ∼= 0.375 for K = 10 and
pc ∼= 0.215 for K = 20. (Inset) Rescaled by wc. The result shows an excellent agreement between
the theory and the simulation.
degree k of the infected node, with wk given by the general form
wk ≡ wk(α) = γk
α , (8)
where γ is a constant that controls the highest possible value of wk, and it is equal or smaller
than k−αmax, where kmax is the largest degree of the network. For α = 0 and γ ∈ [0,1] we
recover the results for a constant value of w, with w = γ. For α > 0 and γ = k−αmax the
rewiring increases with the degree k of the infected node, and decreases with increasing α.
In the limit of α → ∞ the rewiring process is equivalent to a targeted rewiring where only
the links of the highest connected node(s) are rewired. To compare the cases with α = 0
and α > 0, we use the average 〈w〉 over the network, choosing α for the targeted case such
that 〈w〉 is equal to w in the uniform case.
In Fig. 6 we plot nI(w)/nI(0) as a function of 〈w〉 for SF networks with K = 10 and
K = 20. As expected, wc for α > 0 is lower than for α = 0. The preferential rewiring
reduces the value of wc because quarantine is more effective at isolating the superspreaders.
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
We have introduced and studied two strategies for the propagation of epidemics on evolv-
ing networks of social contacts. The states of the individuals are changed according to SIR
dynamics, while the network evolves according to a quarantine mechanism based on lo-
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FIG. 6. Fraction of infected nodes still infected as a function of 〈w〉 for β = 0.05, tR = 20 on an
SF network, λ = 2.1 , N = 104 and K = 10, 20. For general strategy B with α = 0, (K = 10 ()
and K = 20 (N)), and with α > 0, (K = 10 () and K = 20 (△), each 〈w〉 represents a different
α.
cal information, in which susceptible individuals replace their infected neighbors by other
susceptible peers with probability w. We demonstrated by an analytical approach, and con-
firmed by numerical simulations, that the size of the epidemics can be largely reduced by
increasing the probability of rewiring, and that the propagation can be eventually stopped
by using high enough values of w. In other words, quarantine is an effective way to halt the
appearance of epidemics that would otherwise emerge in the case of a static network. For
strategy A, when the infection probabliy is larger than a threshold the quarantine mechanism
is not effective any more and disease propagation becomes unavoidable. This is because the
quarantine model only breaks contact after allowing for a chance of infection, thus for high
enough infection probability, the spreading is irreversible, even with a rewiring probability
of unity. For strategy B, the quarantine mechanism is effective in homogeneous networks
and finite heterogeneous networks, even for infection probability equal to unity. The tran-
sition disappears only for large, very heterogeneous networks. In these scale-free networks,
the critical rewiring probability becomes very large and the transition eventually disappears
for large enough systems, thus only the epidemic phase is observed. This is likely due to
the presence of individuals with very large connectivity that can spread the disease over a
large fraction of the population, even for small infection probabilities. To confirm this, we
introduced a generalized form of strategy B, where the quarantine depends on the degree
of the infected nodes. This preferential rewiring isolates the superspreaders more efficiently,
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reducing wc and preserving a finite transition even for a scale-free networks. Lastly, in SIR
dynamics the final frozen state, where everybody is either recovered or susceptible, is reached
rather quickly —in a time of order lnN according to our simulations— and thus an SIR
network does not evolve much, so the initial topology is preserved during the entire evolu-
tion of the system. In contrast, in adaptive models with SIS or SIRS dynamics the system
evolves for a very long time in the epidemic phase —times that grow exponentially larger
with N— thus the network moves towards a stationary topology similar to an Erdo¨s-Re´nyi
network, independent of the initial topology, and rendering the initial topology irrelevant.
Therefore, unlike other adaptive network models of epidemic spreading, in our model the
epidemic threshold has a strong correlation with the topology of the network, which remains
relatively unchanged at criticality, and the social structure of connections when epidemics
begin to propagate is crucial in the state of the final outbreak.
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